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Abstract—The spreading of dangerous malware or faults
in inter-dependent networks of electronics devices has raised
deep concern, because from the ICT networks infections may
propagate to other Critical Infrastructures producing the
well-known domino or cascading effect. Researchers are
attempting to develop a high level analysis of malware
propagation discarding software details, in order to
generalize to the maximum extent the defensive strategies.
For example, it has been suggested that the maximum
eigenvalue of the network adjacency matrix could act as a
threshold for the malware's spreading. This leads naturally
to use the spectral graph theory to identify the most critical
and influential nodes in technological networks. Many well-
known graph parameters have been studied in the past years
to accomplish the task. Here we test our AV11 algorithm
showing that outperforms degree, closeness, betweenness
centrality and the dynamical importance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
he malicious software (mal-ware) is a program code
designed to produce undesired effects on a computer.
Once malware was specialized. Today, the trend is
reversed toward an unification of these different
dangerous codes and towards a very high technical level.
An issue is the capability to influence not only the ICT
network but also various Critical Infrastructures
dependent from ICT [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [11], [13].
In order to obtain such a result, there are basically two
strategies: the targeted intrusion and the cooperative
search. The first foresees a direct conventional approach
to the actual target, while the second one demands a
distributed control system, a complex communication
scheme and a consensus-like decision making process. As
a side effect of the cooperative search, the malware (or the
fault, it is the same in our approach) will spread in the
network like a disease (the "epidemic" spreading).
Actually, any kind of worm follows the epidemic
spreading, but a standard worm will attempt to invade the
maximum number of machines as quickly as possible,
instead a sophisticated malware adopting a cooperative
search strategy or even a simpler network aware strategy,
will infect (relatively) few machines during a long period
of time. In any case, both seem to propagate following the
T
epidemic spreading model, at least during the initial phase
of the attack. Thus, understanding this model may help in
countering the spreading at the very beginning of it, when
the cost of the defence is more affordable. Important
results on the threshold to the spreading are those of
Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani [3] for the scale free
graphs, and subsequently by Wang et al. [1] and
Chakrabarti et al. [2] for a generic graph. "Generic graph"
means no assumption is made on the graph (scale-free,
random, small-word, degree distribution, etc) or on the
modeling Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible, Susceptible-
Infected-Refractory, Infected-Refractory, etc (SIS, SIR,
IR). 
The threshold is related to two parameters, namely the
infection rate β (average number of machines that can be
infected per time unit by an already infected machine) and
the cure rate δ (average number of machines that can be
restored per time unit). Above the threshold the malware
will propagate, otherwise it will end quickly. 
We will use this claim to identify the most influential
subset of nodes with respect to the maximum eigenvalue. 
II.  DETERMINING THE THRESHOLD
We will sketch the calculation of the threshold using the
Peng's framework, as a theoretical support of our
immunization strategy. Peng et al. [7] have provided an
analytical treatment when β and δ vary but have tested
their claim only on a random Erdos-Renyi artificial graph.
Here we outline briefly the formalism to derive the
stability conditions for the dynamic system of the
spreading, (for details see [7]). The homogeneous models
[1],[2],[3] assume that every machine has equal contact to
others in the population, thus the infection and cure rates
are constant; instead, in this paper we consider a different
infection rate for each link βij and a different cure rate for
each node δi of the (directed or undirected) graph G
representing the Italian AS network. βij and δi are extracted
from a uniform distribution. The first step [7] is the
modified adjacency matrix M obtained from the standard
adjacency matrix A of the undirected graph G, whose
entries mij are modified according to:
                mij= βij                   if   i ≠ j ,       0 ≤ βij ≤  1    
                mij= 1 -  δi        if   i = j ,       0 ≤  δi ≤  1
Note that we allow G to be directed, i.e. βij ≠ βji with no
loss of generality. The difference system representing the
infection dynamics on G is:
 pi(t ) = 1 – Πk (1 – mi,k · pk(t-1) ) ,   i, k=1 ...N            (1)
where pi(t ) is the probability that the node i at the discrete
time t is infected from the node k, N is the number of
nodes. Note that the pi(t-1) should be mutually
independent; if this is not the case, the threshold value
cannot be calculated exactly within the Peng's framework
[7]. Now, since:   
         1 – Πk (1 – mi,k · pk(t-1) ) <  Πk ( mi,k · pk(t) )
the system (2.1) converges to zero iff the difference 
system (2.2)
    pi(t ) =  Πk ( mi,k · pk(t-1) ) ,       i, k=1 ...N               (2)
converges to zero. In compact notation the (2.2) is:
                          P(t) = M·P(t-1)                                  (3)
The system (3) is stable if the largest eigenvalue of M is
[9]:                       
                                 λM  < 1
therefore:
                                 lim P(t) = 0                  when t → ∞
 and                           pi(t ) → 0  ,                  i = 1 ... N
the epidemic spreading disappears. Since M is non
negative, its largest eigenvalue is a real number and the
analytical threshold can be set to:      
                               λthrM=1                                            (4)
Anyway, in this paper we do not use this threshold due
to the unrealistic [7] independence assumptions for (1).
Note that (4) says nothing about the actual spreading
above the threshold: it states only a stop below the
threshold. The real significance of (4) is that the
spreading depends on graph topology: immunizing
nodes/links affects strongly the diffusion of malware. It is
also worth noting that the threshold may be considered as
a phase transition, whose mathematical treatment is
difficult [15].
III. THE IMMUNIZATION ALGORITHMS
Now we introduce some of the most popular procedures
to determinate a number of the most influential nodes [8]
(called the “budget”). Once these nodes have been
selected, we “immunize” them, meaning the cure rate
becomes high. Then we run the simulations and verify if
the infection has been stopped or mitigated. All the
methods (except the k-core, because it depends directly
from the degree) have been tested to evaluate their
immunization capability. Actually, many more
methodologies exist, but the following are probably the
more representatives.
Most infected: according to this simple procedure, the
most influential nodes are those who get infected very
often in the simulations.
Degree: simply the number of links form/to a node.
Intuitively a high degree node (“hub”) may be influential.
Closeness: inverse measure of centrality associated with a
node. The sum of the shortest path lengths between a
given node and all other nodes in the graph. Vertices that
tend to have short geodesic distances to other vertices in
the graph have higher closeness.
Betweenness: total number of shortest paths between
every possible pair of nodes that pass through the given
node. Vertices that occur on many shortest paths between
other vertices have higher betweenness. 
Dynamical Importance: variation of the max eigenvalue
after a node has been removed. Indicates how much the
node is influential with respect to the others. It is a
spectral method.
Estrada Index: SC of a vertex is the “sum” of closed
walks of different lengths in the network starting and
ending at vertex. It characterizes nodes according to their
participation in subgraphs of the network, giving higher
weights to the smaller subgraphs that can be involved in
network motifs. It is a spectral method.
K-core: every subgraph has a vertex of degree at most k:
That is, some vertex in the subgraph touches k or fewer of
the subgraph's edges. Nodes are ranked accordingly.
AV11: For a given graph G, we want to identify
simultaneously the k best nodes (the “budget”) to
immunize or remove, to make the remaining nodes more
robust to the attack. 
Of course, following the spectral paradigm one could
remove a set of k nodes and find the decrease of the
eigenvalue, but this brute-force strategy is impossible to
use, even for small graphs, because of the huge number of
combinations. The problem is NP-complete [14], thus we
resort to our suboptimal algorithm AV11 to reduce
complexity and calculation time as its estimated
complexity is O(kn3*lg(k)). On the other hand, the simple
strategy (calculating the eigenvalue for a single node at a
time, rank the results and take the first k nodes) does not
guarantee good performances, and above all, is easily
understood by the attacker. In fact the attacker running the
same simple algorithm would get exactly the same
information. The AV11 pseudocode (see the Appendix
for a justification and [8] for details) is:
1. Calculate eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix A;
2. Initialize: S to empty; Z= In;  D= (1+| λm|)In ;  
3. Node=0. For i= 0 to k do
4.    P = ( Z*A*Z+D )p;
5.    Node= max( diag(P) );
6.    Add node to S;
7.    Set Z[node, node]= 0;
8.  end for ;
9.  return S.
Fig. 1. The malware diffusion in a LAN and the effect of the AV11
immunization (red points are the remaining infected nodes). The overall
number of nodes in the LAN is 760. The budget is below 4% of nodes.
The blue large point in the centre of the upper imagine is the node who
started the infection. The green points are the nodes selected by AV11
as immunization budget (the green-yellow points are also hubs).
TABLE I
The results of the  immunization procedures in the LAN
Algorithm
Nr. still infected  
nodes, (percentage)
AV11
176   (23%)
ESTRADA INDEX
258   (34%)
CLOSENESS     
263   (35%)
DEGREE           
377   (36.5%)
DYNAMICAL 
IMPORTANCE      
394   (52%)
BETWEENNESS 
414   (54.5%)
MOST INFECTED 
661   (87%)
        
   IV.  EXPERIMENTS
In Table 1 and Figure 1 are shown the effects of various
immunization strategies. Starting from the network
topology of 760 nodes of a LAN (Local Area Network),
the algorithm select a number of nodes to be immunized
(the “budget”). Clearly the budget should be as small as
possible: in this case is below 4%. The infection
developed in the center of the LAN (top image in Figure
1), then all the nodes were affected. In the middle image
are shown the nodes selected by AV11 to be immunized;
in the last image the red points are the computers
remained infected after the AV11 immunization.
Other experiments have been conducted on a High
Voltage electricity distribution network (Table 2 and
Figure 2), following the same criteria as above. Here the
budget is the 13% of 208 nodes.
TABLE 2
The results of the  immunization procedures in the HV distribution 
Algorithm
Nr. still infected  
nodes, (percentage)
AV11                      
5    (2.4%)      
DEGREE                
10   (4.8%)      
BETWEENNESS   
22   (10.6%)     
ESTRADA INDEX
36   (17.4%)
CLOSENESS:        
97   (47%)        
MOST INFECTED:
100   (48.4%)   
DYNAMICAL 
IMPORTANCE
146   (70.5%)    
        
Fig. 2. An high voltage distribution grid. The simulation considers a
cascading failure propagating into the grid. The yellow points initiate
the cascading process. Note how the grid is well structured in order to
guarantee communications and energy transmission, but at the same
time, the connectivity facilitates the cascading effects. 
Fig. 3. An high voltage distribution grid. Before the immunization,
almost all the nodes were affected by a cascading failure (first image,
red points). After the AV11 immunization, only 5 nodes remained
affected by the cascading failure (second image). The budget was 13%
of 208 nodes. 
Finally, the IEEE 118 Bus is analyzed (see Table 3 and 
Figure 4). The budget of nodes to be immunized is 16%  
of 118 nodes.
 TABLE 3
The results of the  immunization procedures in the IEEE 118 Bus 
Algorithm
Nr. still infected 
nodes, (percentage)
        
                    AV11 
                    9        (7.6%)
                   DEGREE :
                   16     (13.6%)
                   BETWEENNESS 
                   52       (44%)
                   ESTRADA INDEX 
                   60      (50.8%)
                   CLOSENESS 
                   70      (59%)
                   MOST INFECTED
                   85      (72%)
                   DYNAMICAL IMPORTANCE
                   88      (74%)
Fig. 4. The IEEE 118 BUS distribution grid. Before the immunization,
almost all nodes were affected by a cascading failure. The budget is the
16% of 118 nodes.
V.  CONCLUSION
The AV11 algorithm performs better than the others
parameters in different topological scenarios. Note that
the second best is not always the degree centrality, as an
intuitive approach could conclude. We think the same
holds for all the degree-like parameters as the K-core. 
Even more important, note the very poor performance of
the most infected strategy. According to this procedure,
the influential nodes, i.e. those nodes that provide a major
support to the epidemic spreading or the cascade effect,
are those who get infected often during simulations. Our
results demonstrate how deceiving this idea is.
Today the infrastructure protection is a major issue in
the most important research programs in the world. In
particular, the ICT infrastructure undergoes devastating
attacks generated by malware and propagating to other
Critical Infrastructures following a domino effect pattern.
Software attack codes are becoming extremely
sophisticated, difficult to detect or foresee and can adopt a
network aware strategy or even an advanced cooperative
target search. 
Although more simulations should be repeated on other
ICT networks, these tests suggest clearly that the
spreading in the technological networks is governed by
the topology, although our results may be transferred to
different type of graph as the contact graph, but probably
not to the social networks, who are governed by more
complex interactions.
Therefore, modelling the malware spread or the fault
cascading on graphs may result in a general purpose
passive defence scheme, effective against a broad range of
threats.
APPENDIX
Because an adjacency matrix A is symmetric, its
eigenvalues are real. Let λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥...≥ λj ≥ λj+1 ≥...≥ λn-1 ≥ λn
be the n eigenvalues of A. We apply the Separation
Theorem for the Hermitian operators on an n -dimensional
space. From this classical theorem, follows that if Ar is a
principal submatrix of A of order r with eigenvalues α1 ≥
α2 ≥...≥ αr-1 ≥ αr then λj ≥ αj ≥ λn-r+j .Therefore, removing k
nodes from the network we get a n-k principal sub-
matrices, whose eigenvalues are localized in λj ≥ αj ≥ λn-( n-k
)+j = λk+j. For the largest eigenvalue of Ar , we obtain λ1 ≥
α1 ≥ λk+1. Thus λk+1 is the absolute minimum largest
eigenvalue we can obtain deleting k nodes from the
network. It is well known that the largest eigenvalue may
be overestimated with the power method. The basics of
the method are the following: at iteration h, the left and
right products Z = f(h) reset h rows and h colomns of A
(h nodes removed). The result A(h) is the n×n adjacency
matrix of the graph with h nodes isolated (or immunized).
The positive diagonal shift by D =(1+| λn |)In guarantees
that every eigenvalue βj(h)= d + λj(h) is positive, where λj(h)
is the j-th eigenvalue of A(h). Now, the trace of the power
is:
(Z⋅A ⋅ Z+D)p = ( A(h) +d⋅In )p =( b11(h) … b1n(h) … … … b1n(h)
… bnn(h) )   
and it is known to satisfy :
Trace = ( A(h) +d⋅In )p > ∑i bii(h)  ≥ ∑ j ( d+ λj(h) )p
 Therefore, from: 
( d+λ1(h) )p [ 1+ ∑j ( d+λj(h) / d+ λ1(h) )p ] = Trace( A(h)
+ ⋅d In )p
follows that:
( d+ λ1(h) ) [ 1+ ∑ j ( d+ λj(h) / d+ λ1(h) )p ]1/p = (Trace( A(h)
+d⋅In )1/p                  
Being 0 < ( d+ λj(h) / d+ λ1(h) ) < 1 
                              j=2,3,...,n 
And when p→∞ ,  we have: 
d+ λ1(h) ≈ (Trace( A(h) +d⋅In )p)1/p 
Here we are interested in the: 
d + λ1(h) ≤ ( Trace( A(h)+d⋅In )p )1/p =  ( ∑i bii(h) )1/p
In words, (A.4) states that reducing diagonal elements
bii(h) of (A(h)+d⋅In)p forces the reduction of the largest
eigenvalue λ1(h). Resetting the i-th row and the i-th colomn
in A, means to reset an eigenvalue λj(h) and make bii(h) = dp
Hence, at h iteration there are h diagonal elements such
that bii(h) = dp  and
d+ λ1(h) ≤ ( hdp + ∑j bij ij (h) )1/p
The positive diagonal shift D =( 1+| λn | )In allows to use
any positive integer p for the power. In fact, if p is an odd
number and some d+λj(h) are negative, then the ratios
d+λj(h) / d+λ1(h) are not all positive; this invalid the
inequality. In addition, for the Separation Theorem we
have d+αj > 0 for every principal sub-matrix of A. Thus,
we can use the same value during all the iterations: every
shifted adjacency matrix will be a positive definite matrix.
The computational complexity of AV11 is O(kn3log(p)) as
the power of a matrix is computed by repeated
multiplications. If the complexity for each product of two
n×n matrices is O(n3), then we have to do O(n3log(p))
operations for k iterations.
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